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Introduction and summary
Capital adequacy has long been central to the regula-
tory oversight of banking systems around the world.
Capital is crucial to bank safety and soundness, be-
cause it represents the cushion available to financial
institutions to withstand unanticipated losses. By moni-
toring capital levels, supervisors seek to predict which fi-
nancial institutions are most likely to be at risk if
subjected to an earnings or asset quality shock. In 1991,
the passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion Improvement Act (FDICIA) emphasized capital
levels as a key benchmark to use in determining appro-
priate supervisory interventions to aid ailing financial
institutions. Intervention when an institution is beginning
to experience problems may allow it to avoid failure.
Over the past two decades, various off-site mon-
itoring systems have been created to identify devel-
oping financial problems at banking institutions between
on-site examinations. Supervisors use the output from
these monitoring or early warning system (EWS) mod-
els to determine which organizations need increased
supervisory scrutiny, identify specific areas of con-
cern, accelerate on-site examinations of institutions
showing financial deterioration, and allocate more
experienced or more specialized examiners to institu-
tions with financial problems.
The current models used by bank regulators focus
on predicting either CAMELS1 downgrade or bank
failure.2 In this article, we develop EWS models that
focus on identifying banks that will have inadequate
capital in the following year. Specifically, our models
predict banks with an early stage of capital distress,
with a primary capital to assets ratio falling below
the 5.5 percent minimum capital adequacy standard
(the relevant capital standard for this period). Earlier
identification of capital inadequacy would enable su-
pervisors to identify firms at risk and manage timely
supervisory interventions.
Based on samples of banks in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, we test our EWS models empirically us-
ing financial and economic data for individual banks.
We chose 1988–90 as the sample period, rather than a
more recent period, in order to have a sufficient num-
ber of problem banks in the sample. Also, since most
troubled banks are those with assets of less than $1
billion, we focus on these banks in our study. We also
exclude banks with less than $300 million in assets.
Our objective is to develop a model that predicts
one of two states—capital adequate versus capital in-
adequate—where the latter state represents capital
levels that fall below a minimum threshold employed
by bank supervisors during this period. Although we
use a well-recognized regulatory threshold for ade-
quate capital, our main objective is to examine an
early stage of financial distress, rather than regulato-
ry compliance with capital standards.3
Our choice of the capital to asset ratio as a plau-
sible proxy for the early onset of financial distress is
supported by previous research. Estrella, Park, and
Peristiani (2000) examined the relationship between
different capital ratios and bank failure and found
that the simple capital to assets ratio (leverage ratio)
predicts bank failure as well as more complex risk-
weighted capital ratios over one-year or two-year
horizons. In addition, they recommended using the50 3Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
simple capital ratio as a tool to provide a timely sig-
nal of the need for supervisory action.
Our empirical results reveal that banks with im-
pending capital deficiency are much different from
other banks in terms of their financial condition. Also,
our EWS models are able to detect the early onset of
financial distress in commercial banks one year in
advance with a reasonable degree of accuracy. Impor-
tantly, we compare three EWS models—a simple logit
model that includes only the lagged capital ratio and
lagged change in capital ratio, a more complete logit
model, and a non-parametric trait recognition analy-
sis (TRA) model. Our results suggest that simple lin-
ear models perform better than more complex EWS
models such as the TRA. This is interesting given the
substantial disagreement in the statistical forecasting
literature on the merits of non-parametric approaches
versus statistical models such as logit. We conclude
that EWS models could be useful to bank regulators
as both an off-site surveillance tool and a supplement
to on-site examinations by supervisory personnel. In
addition, simple linear logit EWS approaches could
perform just as well as or better than highly sophisti-
cated models in flagging capital-inadequate banks
one year ahead.4
In the next section, we review the types of EWS
models currently being used by the major bank regu-
latory agencies and survey the literature on the per-
formance of these models. Then, we introduce our
three models and compare their results.
EWS models in use and literature
This section describes the various EWS models
used by federal bank regulators (the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation [FDIC], the Federal Reserve,
and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
[OCC]) and reviews the literature on early warning
models. It is important to note that all predictions
from EWS models involve a set of trade-offs. That is,
a model’s accuracy may be measured by two broad
types of misclassification—Type-1 error and Type-2
error. For the purposes of this study, Type-1 errors or
false positives are more serious than Type-2 errors or
false negatives. For example, a misclassification of
unsatisfactory banks as satisfactory (Type-1 error)
can be costly and result in a bank failure that might
have been prevented by early supervisory interven-
tion. On the other hand, the cost of misclassifying
satisfactory banks as unsatisfactory (Type-2 error) is
limited to the cost of focusing unnecessary supervi-
sory resources on a healthy bank. We begin with an
overview of the FDIC’s model.
The FDIC model
The FDIC began developing EWS models in the
mid-1980s. Its current model, called the SCOR (Sta-
tistical CAMELS Off-Site Ratings) model, uses Call
Report data to identify banks likely to experience a
downgrade at the next on-site examination, using step-
wise ordered logit analysis. According to Collier et
al. (2003), the SCOR model has played an important
role in the FDIC supervisory process—that is, in off-
site monitoring, in resource allocation for examinations,
and in tracking industry trends. The SCOR model
predicts the probability that a bank will be assigned a
specific rating (1, 2, 3, 4, or 5, where 1 is best and 5
is worst) and the probability that a bank’s rating will
be downgraded. The following financial variables are
included: total equity capital, loan loss reserve, past
due loans 30–89 days, past due loans 90+ days, non-
accrual loans, other real estate owned, net charge-offs,
provision for loan losses, net income, cash dividends
declared, volatile liabilities, liquid assets, and loans
and long-term securities.5 All variables are in ratios
as a percentage of total assets. The model is currently
set to flag banks with at least a 35 percent probability
of being downgraded. Tests of the accuracy of the
FDIC model, as reported in Collier et al. (2003), in-
dicate that approximately two-thirds of the institutions
that were actually downgraded were not flagged by
the model, and approximately two-thirds of the insti-
tutions that the model did flag for downgrades were
not downgraded. The model’s accuracy relies on the
accuracy of its financial information inputs.6
The Federal Reserve model
In the 1990s, the Federal Reserve System moved
from a surveillance process that relied on screening
key financial ratios to one that incorporated econometric
models to predict financial conditions. In 1995, the
Federal Reserve developed the current EWS model
called SEER (System to Estimate Examination Rat-
ings). There are two parts of the SEER model—the
SEER Rating model and the SEER Risk Rank model.
The SEER Rating model:
Like the FDIC’s SCOR model, the Federal Re-
serve’s SEER model predicts the probability that a
bank will be assigned each of the five possible ratings,
using a stepwise multinomial logit analysis. The SEER
rating is then calculated as the sum of the five rating
levels multiplied by their respective probabilities. In
addition, the SEER Rating model is often used to clas-
sify banks into satisfactory (1- or 2-rated) and unsat-
isfactory (3-, 4-, or 5-rated) categories.
The model utilizes two previous quarters of Call
Report and examination data. The model includes51 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
approximately 45 financial and non-financial variables
in the analysis. Through a stepwise selection process,
different variables are selected to be included in the
final model in each quarter. The variables that have
consistently remained statistically significant in each
quarter are proxies for, among other things, capital
adequacy, asset quality, earnings performance, and li-
quidity. These are variables typically used by exam-
iners in evaluating the condition of a bank. In addition,
the prior composite CAMELS rating is also included
in the SEER Rating model.7 The economic variables,
such as unemployment, income per capita, and per-
mits per capita, are usually not statistically significant.
The SEER Risk Rank model:
The objective of the model is to estimate the
likelihood that a bank will fail or become critically
undercapitalized (according to prompt corrective ac-
tion standards) during the subsequent two years. The
model was originally re-estimated each quarter using
a stepwise probit regression based on data on failed
and undercapitalized banks from the prior years. How-
ever, as the number of failed or critically undercapi-
talized banks decreased throughout the 1990s, a pooled
cross-section and time-series model based on data
from 1985 to 1991 was developed to capture enough
failed institutions to estimate the model. The Risk
Rank model is no longer re-estimated.
Both of the SEER models seem to perform well.
According to the original validation tests in Cole,
Cornyn, and Gunther (1995), based on ten separate
quarterly estimates using data from December 1989
to March 1992, the SEER Rating model was highly
accurate in predicting banks with 1 and 2 ratings. That
is, 77.5 percent of 1-rated banks and 79.9 percent of
2-rated banks were correctly predicted. In addition,
out of their 262 sampled failing banks, 97.7 percent
received a SEER rating of 5; 1.9 percent received a 4
rating; and the remaining 0.4 percent received a 3 rating.
None of the banks received a SEER rating of 1 or 2.8
In addition, the models have been revalidated on an an-
nual cycle, and, accordingly, a significant number of
enhancements have been made to the model since 1995.
The OCC model
The OCC uses a monitoring system called Canary
that consists of a diverse array of supervisory and eco-
nomic predictive models and tools, organized into four
components—Benchmarks, Credit Scope, Market
Barometers, and Predictive Models. The OCC also
uses the FDIC’s SCOR model (described earlier) as
one component of the off-site monitoring system.9
Peer Group Risk Models (PGRMs) are one type
of predictive model used by the OCC. PGRMs are a
series of econometric models designed to predict the
potential impact of different economic scenarios on a
bank’s return on assets (ROA) over the next three
years and how a bank will perform relative to similar
asset-based bank peer groups.10 Banks are classified
into 11 different groups based on the specialization
in their loan portfolios and whether they are de novo
banks.11 The model uses various economic indicators,
including interest rates, prices, wages, unemployment
rates, and bankruptcy. Bank-specific financial variables
include nonperforming loans, provisions for loan and
lease losses, and capital–asset ratios. In addition, spe-
cific financial and economic factors that are likely to
impact banks in certain peer groups are included, such
as farm incomes and farm output prices for those in
the agricultural peer group. Information about perfor-
mance and accuracy of the OCC model’s results is
currently not publicly available.
Review of EWS literature
Several research studies examine the factors that
are important in determining bank failure or impor-
tant for off-site surveillance.
Whalen (1991) examines a particular type of EWS
model called a Cox proportional hazards model, which
produces estimates of the probability that a bank with
a given set of characteristics will survive longer than
some specified length of time into the future. Using a
relatively small set of publicly available explanatory
variables, the model identifies both failed and healthy
banks with a high degree of accuracy. A large proportion
of banks that subsequently failed are flagged as poten-
tial failures in periods prior to their actual demise. The
author concludes that reasonably accurate EWS mod-
els can be built and maintained at relatively low cost.
Thomson (1991) models bank failures of all sizes
based on Call Report data using a logit regression anal-
ysis. The probability that a bank will fail is a function
of capital adequacy, asset quality, management quali-
ty, earnings performance, and the relative liquidity of
the portfolio. These are CAMELS-motivated proxy
variables. Thomson finds that the majority of these
factors are significantly related to the probability of
failure as much as four years before a bank fails.
Cole and Gunther (1998) develop a model of bank
failure, using a probit analysis to estimate the relation-
ship between a set of financial ratios and the likelihood
of bank failure during the subsequent two-year period.
They find that the information content of the CAMELS
ratings derived from on-site examinations can decay
fairly rapidly. The ability of CAMELS ratings to identi-
fy bank failures matches or exceeds that of their off-site
EWS model only when the ratings are based on exams52 3Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
conducted no more than one or two quarters prior to
the forecast period. However, they also note that the
effectiveness of off-site EWS models depends on the
integrity of accounting data, which is enhanced
through periodic exams. Thus, EWS is not meant to
substitute for on-site examinations.
Gunther and Moore (2000) note that Call Report
data are often subject to revisions. They find evidence
of a strong relationship between on-site exams and
Call Report revisions, pointing to a substantial audit-
ing role for on-site exams. This suggests that the ac-
curacy of EWS models may be overstated when
using Call Report real-time data. However, they find
no empirical evidence of any substantial impact of
the data revisions on the model’s ability to predict
downgrades.12 Thus, real-time data are still useful in
the EWS model for off-site monitoring.
Gilbert, Meyer, and Vaughan (1999) compare
univariate and multivariate models’ ability to predict
bank failures. They find that the “best” single variable
varied from year to year, and that only multivariate
models could provide consistently accurate predictions.
One of the most significant variables in all their tests
was the equity ratio. Our work builds upon their re-
sults by expanding the variables and interactions in-
cluded in the analysis.
Finally, Krainer and Lopez (2003) suggest that
market information may be included in the EWS mod-
el. They find that changes in stock prices tend to pre-
cede changes in supervisory BHC ratings by at least
nine months. They conclude that equity market infor-
mation can be useful to supervisors.
Comparison of three EWS models
We test our three EWS models using financial
and economic data for sample banks. The models are
1) a simple logit model comprising only the lagged
capital ratio and lagged change in capital ratio, 2) a
more complete stepwise logit (parametric or statistical)
model, and 3) the non-parametric method of trait rec-
ognition analysis (TRA).
We developed our set of explanatory variables
for predicting banks that will become capital inade-
quate based on a wide variety of on- and off-balance-
sheet measures currently used by regulators to gauge
bank risks—including those used in the Fed’s SEER
model and the FDIC’s SCOR model (for example,
profitability, loan risk, operational risk, liquidity risk,
interest rate gap, bank size, derivatives exposure, loan
commitments, years in the banking business, and
changes in loan compositions). We also incorporate a
number of control variables that reflect economic condi-
tions, including information on business bankruptcy
filings in the state in the past year, rural versus urban
location of the bank, and income per capita and per-
mits per capita in the state where the banks are locat-
ed. Table 1 lists the 42 explanatory variables we use
in our analysis.
We use data from the Call Reports for year-end
1987, 1988, 1989, and 1990. The empirical method-
ologies are described in box 1 (logit) and box 2 (TRA).
Our research methodology is implemented in two steps.
In step one, for the original sample using year-end
1989 data, we assigned each sample bank a dummy
value of 1 (adequate capital) if the ratio of primary capi-
tal to assets was equal to or greater than 5.5 percent,
and 0 (inadequate capital) otherwise.13 We assembled
financial and economic data for the original sample one
year prior to the capital inadequacy event using year-
end 1988 data. We also used the year-end 1987 data in
the calculation of the lagged change variables. We then
developed our in-sample models (logit and TRA mod-
els). The models seek to classify banks—adequately
capitalized versus inadequately capitalized—correctly
in 1989. Banks that were already inadequately capital-
ized in 1988 are excluded from the in-sample analysis,
since supervisors are more interested in those banks
that were adequately capitalized in 1988 but might
become capital inadequate in 1989.
In step two, we coded the data for the 1990 hold-
out sample as 0 or 1 based on the 5.5 percent primary
capital ratio as of year-end 1990. One-year prior data
for the independent variables were passed through the
logit and TRA models for holdout sample banks. Banks
that were already inadequately capitalized in 1989
are not included in this holdout sample test for the
reason described earlier. This is to test the predictive
accuracy of our EWS models (developed during the
original sample period) in predicting capital inadequacy
in the out-of-sample period (1990). As such, the hold-
out sample test allows us to observe and compare the
predictive ability of the three EWS models with data
that were not employed in their development.
The final sample, after dropping institutions with
missing data, consists of 477 banks in the original sample
and 499 banks in the holdout sample. Of the 477 banks
in the original sample, 26 banks that were capital adequate
in 1988 became capital inadequate in 1989. Of the 499
banks in the holdout sample, 38 banks that were cap-
ital adequate in 1989 became capital inadequate in 1990.
For supervisory purposes, the most meaningful
measure of accuracy is the ability to classify banks
correctly in a future period rather than in the previ-
ous periods. Therefore, we focus on the models’ pre-
dictive accuracy in the holdout period. Below, we
discuss the results, which are presented in table 2 (p. 56).53 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
As we can see in table 2, panel A, the simple logit
model, with only lagged capital ratio and lagged change
in capital ratio included as explanatory variables, per-
formed quite well in the holdout period. The overall
accuracy of prediction is 79.96 percent—with 21.05
percent Type-1 error and 19.96 percent Type-2 error.
The model accurately predicted 30 capital inadequate
banks, but failed to accurately predict eight of the 38
capital inadequate banks. Of the 461 capital adequate
banks, the model mistakenly predicted 92 of them
(19.96 percent) as being capital inadequate.
Table 2, panel B shows the results from the more
complete logit model, which includes all 42 explana-
tory variables in the analysis. Through a stepwise se-
lection process, only 16 variables are included in the
final logit model.14 Interestingly, the model did not
perform as well as the simple logit model in predicting
capital inadequate banks in the holdout period. While
TABLE 1
List of explanatory variables
Variable descriptions Xi
Special characteristics
Dummy for de novo banks (1 if less than 10 years) X3
Dummy for MSA (1 if in metropolitan statistical area) X4
Number of full-time employees to total assets X18
Financial variables (Call Report data)
Lagged capital ratio X1
Lagged change in capital ratio X2
Total assets X5
Net income after tax to total assets X6
Net interest income plus noninterest income to noninterest expenses X17
Provision of loan and lease losses to total assets X13
Other borrowed funds to total assets X14
Core deposits to total deposits X15
Total cash dividends to total assets X16
Short-term interest rate gap to total assets X19
Loans made to insiders to total assets X21
Insured deposits to total liabilities X22
Jumbo CDs to total assets X23
Short-term assets to short-term liabilities X24
Total loans to core deposits X25
Total loans to total deposits X26
Average maturity of assets X27
Nonperforming loans (more than 90 days accruing) to assets X28
Nonperforming loans (more than 90 days nonaccruing) to assets X29
Agricultural nonperforming loans to total agricultural loans X30
C&I nonperforming loans to total C&I loans X31
Consumer nonperforming loans to total consumer loans X32
Real estate nonperforming loans to total real estate loans X33
Foreign exchange transactions to total assets X34
Off-balance-sheet interest rate risk (all FX derivatives) to assets X35
Off-balance-sheet loan commitments to total assets X36
Other real estate loans to total assets X37
Noninterest expenses to total assets X7
Investment securities (book value) to total assets X40
Growth and volatility variables
Average quarterly loan growth over the year, agricultural loans X8
Average quarterly loan growth over the year, C&I loans X9
Average quarterly loan growth over the year, CRE loans X10
Average quarterly loan growth over the year, consumer loans X11
Average quarterly loan growth over the year, mortgage loans X12
Volatility of consumer loan volume X41
Economic factors
Number of bankruptcy filings X39
Business bankruptcy filings information X42
Income per capita (personal income to labor force at state level) X20
Number of permits per capita at state level X3854 3Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
the overall accuracy of prediction is 83.17 percent (high-
er than the overall accuracy of prediction of the simple
model), the complete logit model failed to predict 76
percent of the capital inadequate banks. Specifically,
the complete model’s Type-1 error is 76.32 percent
and Type-2 error is 11.93 percent. The model failed
to accurately predict 29 of the 38 capital inadequate
banks, and mistakenly predicted 55 of the 461 good
banks to be capital inadequate.
Table 2, panel C presents the results of the TRA mod-
el, with all 42 explanatory variables and the interactions
included in the analysis. This is the most complex of
the three models. Its overall accuracy of prediction was
exceptional at 99.23 percent in the original sample peri-
od, but dropped to 77.35 percent in the holdout period.
The TRA model’s Type-1 error is 47.37 percent and
Type-2 error is 20.61 percent. In terms of accurately pre-
dicting capital inadequate banks, the TRA model per-
formed better than the complete logit model, but not as
well as the simplest logit model, which has the best pre-
diction record with the smallest number of Type-1 er-
rors. The TRA model failed to accurately predict 18 of
the 38 capital inadequate banks, and mistakenly predict-
ed 95 of the 461 good banks to be capital inadequate.
However, the TRA model may be viewed as having
an advantage over logit models. In the modeling process,
the TRA identified 89 safe features and 80 unsafe fea-
tures—banks with safe features are less likely to encoun-
ter financial distress in the near future, whereas banks
with unsafe features are those whose capital ratios are
likely to fall below an adequate level within a one-year
time frame. These identified safe and unsafe traits can
serve as the starting point for on-site reviews.15
An important aspect of the TRA model is high-
lighted by this collection of traits. It takes into con-
sideration that financial variables are related; thus, the
same variable can be “good” or “bad” depending on
the value of other variables. This non-parametric ap-
proach identifies collections of factors that together
can be red flags for supervisors, providing a more
detailed picture of the potential issues the institution
may be facing. Unlike parametric estimations, TRA
does not assume independence among the explanatory
variables. In addition, TRA is a flexible enough ap-
proach to identify separate features for “good’ and
“bad” states, so that “good” and “bad” traits are not
mirror images of each other.
Overall, both the logit and TRA models developed
in this article would enable bank supervisors to iden-
tify most capital inadequate banks one year ahead of
time. It is interesting, and surprising, to see that the sim-
plest model (the logit model with only lagged capital
BOX 1
Logit models
Logit is one of the most commonly employed paramet-
ric EWS models in business academic studies as well
as bank regulatory practice—see Amemiya (1973, 1981)
for a detailed discussion of this technique. The logit
model has the statistical property of not assuming mul-
tivariate normality among the independent variables.
The dependent variable is the log of the bank’s
odds of capital inadequacy versus capital adequacy,
as shown in equation 1, where Pi is the probability
that bank i is a member of the capital inadequate
group of banks as opposed to the capital adequate
group of banks.
1) Log [Pi /(1–Pi)] = a1iX1i + a2iX2i + … aniXni.
One advantage of logit models is that statistical
software is readily available. However, as in any other
parametric model, logit is not well suited to explor-
ing interactions between large numbers of variables
due to losses in degrees of freedom. Relatedly, inter-
action variables are typically computed by multiply-
ing two variables, which tends to lose information.
For example, consider two banks, one with a
high return on assets and low capital ratio and the
other with a low return on assets and high capital ra-
tio. The product of the return on assets and capital
ratio would be moderate in level in both cases; as
such, their interaction would lose information about
each of the component ratios.
Model 1: Simple logit
The predicted probability of becoming capital in-
adequate one year from now is estimated from two
simple factors X1i and X2i, as shown in equation 2,
where X1i is bank i’s lagged capital ratio and X2i is
bank i’s lagged change in capital ratio.
2) Log [Pi /(1–Pi)] = a1iX1i + a2iX2i.
Model 2: Stepwise logit
The predicted probability of becoming capital
inadequate one year from now is estimated from 42
different financial and economic variables (listed in
table 1), rather than just two capital ratio variables
as in model 1. Only 16 of these 42 factors entered
the model through a stepwise logit procedure.
Panels A and B of table 2 present the logistic
results of model 1 and model 2, respectively.55 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
BOX 2
TRA models
Unlike logit models, the TRA approach is a non-para-
metric technique that identifies systematic patterns
in the data. TRA was originally developed in the hard
sciences and used to predict the risk of earthquakes
and the location of oil and uranium fields. In recent
years, it has been applied to predicting bank failure.
Unlike traditional econometric models, TRA avoids
assumptions about the underlying distribution or in-
dependence of the variables.
TRA is most closely associated with neural net-
work models in that it seeks to exploit information
contained in complex interactions of the independent
variable set. A unique aspect of TRA is that variable
interactions could be formed to be consistent with
the logic of a financial analyst, rather simple cross
products of variables. For example, an interaction
variable could be defined as high return on assets
and low capital ratio, or vice versa. As such, infor-
mation about components of interaction variables
is not lost.
Performing a TRA analysis requires a number
of steps. For a detailed discussion of the TRA tech-
nique, see Kolari, Caputo, and Wagner (1996), Kolari,
Glennon, Shin, and Caputo (2002), and Jagtiani,
Kolari, Lemieux, and Shin (2002). We provide a
very brief summary of the process below.
Our TRA analysis utilizes all 42 explanatory vari-
ables listed in table 1. In building the TRA model,
we follow the following steps:
We select cutoffs for each of the 42 independent
variables to divide banks into three categories (low,
medium, and high) for each variable. We then recode
the variables into binary strings. For example, bank
i’s variable vector may be [X1,X2,X3] = [010011].
This implies that bank i is in the middle (01), low (00),
and upper (11) segments of the distributions of X1,
X2, and X3, respectively. The six-digit code [010011]
is known as a “trait” of the ith bank. Using variables
three at a time, we can produce a long list of traits
for each bank.
The trait matrix is a list of all the traits for each
bank using the binary strings from the previous step.
The pattern of these binary strings, or traits, is useful
in discriminating between good and problem banks.
For example, traits commonly found in capital ade-
quate banks but seldom found in capital inadequate
banks are retained as “good traits” or “safe features.”
Traits commonly found in capital inadequate banks
but seldom found in capital adequate banks are re-
tained as “bad traits” or “unsafe features.”
Now we can construct a matrix of the number
of good traits on the X axis and the number of bad
traits on the Y axis. Each bank is put into a cell in
this matrix based on the number of its good and bad
traits. This step is called voting.
If a bank has far more good votes (good traits) than
bad votes (bad traits), then it is identified as capital ad-
equate, and vice versa for capital inadequate banks.
Finally, we use the voting matrix to classify out-of-
sample observations to verify the prediction accuracy
of the model in the post-sample period. These banks
were not used in making the traits and voting matrix.
This allows us to see whether the trait recognition meth-
od is able to discriminate between capital inadequate
and capital adequate banks in the post-sample period.
Like any other EWS models, TRA models are sub-
ject to some drawbacks. The most serious difficulty
is the considerable hands-on manipulation required
by the researchers, such as creating and inputting cut-
points as well as selecting the minimum and maximum
percentage definitions of features.
In addition, no statistical measures of variables’
importance are produced in the TRA analysis, since
it is not a statistical approach. This shortfall, however,
may not be an issue if the research goal is the model’s
prediction accuracy rather than the significance of
individual variables. Also, TRA has an advantage over
other techniques in generating a list of good and bad
traits that may well be useful to bank supervisors in
better understanding a bank’s strengths and weaknesses.
ratio and lagged change in capital ratio) turned out to
be just as useful, if not more so, than the sophisticated
models in the holdout sample tests. Its Type-1 error
is smaller than that of the other models. Type-1 errors
are the most serious, as they mean that the model
failed to warn regulators that the bank was going to
fall below capital standards in the near future.
The accuracy of the simplest logit model may be
partly driven by the inclusion of the lagged capital
ratio, since banks’ capital ratios do not usually change
drastically from one year to the next. However, it is
important to point out that our analysis excludes all
banks that were already inadequately capitalized. Our
results suggest that it would be beneficial for super-
visors to allocate more examination resources to banks
whose capital levels are approaching the minimum
adequate level and to closely supervise and monitor
these banks.
Figure 1, panel A demonstrates that the simple
logit model (with only lagged capital ratio and lagged
change in capital ratio) outperforms the TRA model.
Its Type-1 errors are typically smaller than the TRA’s56 3Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
for any given Type-2 errors. Figure 1, panel B com-
pares the complete logit model (with all 42 variables
included in the analysis and 16 variables kept in the
model) and the TRA model (most complicated and
non-parametric). The plot suggests that TRA outper-
forms the complete stepwise logit model.
Conclusion
This article focuses on the continuing body of
work that attempts to develop early warning systems
(EWS) for detecting deterioration in a bank’s financial
condition. While mandatory on-site examinations pro-
vide supervisors with the opportunity to review all
information and to develop a periodic view of the in-
stitution’s financial condition, supervisors need a
means of identifying at-risk institutions so that super-
visory actions can be taken during the period between
exams. Regulators currently have EWS models, which
attempt to flag troubled institutions that are likely to
fail using logit analysis.
TABLE 2
Results of the three models
A. Simplest logit model (only lagged capital ratio and lagged change in capital ratio as explanatory variables) at PL = 0.08
Model: Log[Pi/1–Pi]  =  3.56 – 94.91 (X1) – 8.82 (X2).
Original sample Holdout sample
Predicted Predicted
Actual Inadequate Adequate Actual Inadequate Adequate
Inadequate 14 12 Inadequate 30 8
(46.15%) (21.05%)
Adequate 111 340 Adequate 92 369
(24.61%) (19.96%)
Overall accuracy prediction: 74.21% Overall accuracy prediction: 79.96%
B. Stepwise logit model (with 16 explanatory variables included) at PL = 0.10
Model: Log[Pi/1–Pi]  =  4.38 – 74.88 (X1) – 7.44 (X2) – 163.8 (X6) – 0.12 (X9) + 0.002 (X10) + 0.03 (X11) +88.36 (X13) +
62.98 (X28) – 16.60 (X30) – 54.02 (X31) + 36.28 (X32) + 15.78 (X33)  + 31.53 (X37) – 15.83 (X39) – 6.13 (X40)
Original sample Holdout sample
Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
Inadequate Adequate Inadequate Adequate
Inadequate 13 13 Inadequate 9 29
(50.0%) (76.32%)
Adequate 44 407 Adequate 55 406
(9.76%) (11.93%)
Overall accuracy prediction: 88.05% Overall accuracy prediction: 83.17%
C. Trait recognition analysis (TRA) model
Original sample Holdout sample
Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
Inadequate Adequate Inadequate Adequate
Inadequate 24 2 Inadequate 20 18
(2.60%) (47.37%)
Adequate 0 451 Adequate 95 366
(0.00%) (20.61%)
Overall accuracy prediction: 99.23% Overall accuracy prediction: 77.35%57 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
FIGURE 1
Comparing Type-1 and Type-2 error
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Our study departs from the existing EWS mod-
els currently used by bank regulators in two respects.
First, our models attempt to identify institutions that
are likely to become capital inadequate (not failures)
in the next year. FDICIA, passed in 1991, contains a
series of mandatory and discretionary actions supervi-
sors can impose as a bank’s capital deteriorates, up to
and including closure if capital falls below 2 percent
of assets. Our EWS models could provide bank super-
visors with this early warning of the onset of distress.
Second, in addition to just flagging problem banks, we
also explore alternative statistical and non-parametric
models ranging from a simple logit model to a com-
plicated trait recognition analysis non-parametric mod-
el. This process has allowed us to gain insights into
what information is most important in terms of predict-
ing pending capital problems at commercial banks.
Using 1987, 1988, and 1989 data for a sample of
medium-sized banks, we developed three different
EWS models in this article. The first and simplest mod-
el estimates banks with inadequate capital based on
last period’s level of capital and the trend in capital
levels using a logit regression analysis. The second
model is the complete logit stepwise analysis, which
employs a wide variety of financial and economic
variables similar to those in the supervisory models,
with the exception that it predicts the likelihood of
capital adequate or inadequate rather than failure or
CAMELS downgrades. The third model is the non-
parametric TRA model, which relies on patterns on
the data to identify combinations of traits that are most
often found in banks with adequate capital levels and
combinations of traits found in banks that have inad-
equate capital levels.
The in-sample results indicate that all three mod-
els are able to predict banks with inadequate capital
levels. These results show that it is possible to predict
early stages of financial distress using off-site data.
Comparing performance of the three models in the
original sample period, the TRA model’s record was
superior. It accurately predicted all adequately capi-
talized banks and only incorrectly classified two banks
with inadequate capital as having adequate capital.
However, the true value to supervisors is performance
in out-of-sample tests.
Using the developed models, we conducted out-
of-sample tests to see which approach provides the
“best” estimate of adequate and inadequate capital
levels based on 1988, 1989, and 1990 data. We define
“best” as missing the smallest number of inadequately
capitalized banks—in other words, having the small-
est number of Type-1 errors. This is the measure that
is most relevant to supervisors because it is more
costly to miss detecting deterioration in a bank’s fi-
nancial condition than it is to more closely supervise
an adequately capitalized bank.
Results presented for each model for the holdout
sample indicate that while the complete logit model
has the best prediction record overall, the simple logit
model has the best prediction record for missing the
smallest number of capital inadequate banks (smallest
number of Type-1 errors). The simplest logit model
has 79.95 percent accuracy in predicting inadequate-
ly capitalized banks, compared with only 23.68 per-
cent for the complete stepwise logit model and 52.63
percent for the TRA model.
With the caveat that our empirical results are based
on a recessionary sample period and should be tested
under different economic conditions, our results im-
ply that the probability of tripping a capital tripwire,
which is an effective early indicator of financial dete-
rioration, could be predicted using off-site data. Ex-
isting supervisory models generally focus on the
probability of failure and CAMELS downgrades.
In addition, we found that a simple logit model
could do quite well in predicting the likelihood of
deteriorating capital levels in both in-sample and out-
of-sample tests. However, these models provide little
insight into the root cause of the problem. Unlike the
simple logit model, the TRA technique provides more
detailed information—that is, information on the com-
bined impact of the various groups of explanatory
variables. This additional information could provide
supervisors with a head start in identifying the root
cause of changes in a bank’s financial condition. There-
fore, using a TRA technique in conjunction with the
current logit EWS models could potentially enhance
off-site monitoring effectiveness.
Although a complete cost/benefit analysis is be-
yond the scope of this article, we feel that the marginal
cost of developing and maintaining this additional
feature is relatively small compared with the potential
cost of a bank failure or more frequent on-site exami-
nations. Understanding the root cause of the bank’s
problems will likely enhance the effectiveness of
supervisory intervention and help guide examination
resources toward the institutions with the greatest
potential for problems.
To give some perspective on the importance of
identifying emerging problem banks, it is important
to point out that unless banks have identified problems,
they are generally examined every 12 to 18 months de-
pending on their asset size. However, the value of su-
pervisory ratings tends to deteriorate as soon as six
months after on-site examinations (see Cole and Gunther,
1998 and 1995). Thus, this additional modeling59 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
effort could be viewed as a way of augmenting exist-
ing supervisory ratings as more current information
becomes available.
Ideally, the current logit EWS models may be used
to identify those institutions where additional questions
should be asked, and the TRA model may be used to
provide supervisors with a better idea about which
questions to ask. Knowledge of safe and unsafe features
could guide examiners as they develop an integrated
evaluation of the financial condition of the entire or-
ganization instead of focusing on isolated individual
ratios. For example, a high return on assets (ROA) is
not always an indication of sound financial condition.
High ROA in a de novo institution, in the presence of
rising delinquencies, or combined with a rising assets
per employee ratio, may be an indication of problems.
Finally, there is one important caveat. No model
can accurately predict financial stress if the financial
data are not accurate. One of the benefits of on-site
examinations is the potential to identify inaccurate or
misleading financial reporting, particularly regarding
reserves for problem loans and loan write-offs. Previ-
ous research suggests that any off-site monitoring
system that relies completely on Call Report data is
subject to errors due to misreporting of financial
data. Off-site EWS models should be regarded as an
aid to, but not as a substitute for, the critical roles of
examiner experience and judgement.
NOTES
1CAMELS stands for capital adequacy, asset quality, management
quality, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk.
2The regulators’ failure prediction model predicts banks that are
likely to declare equity insolvency or become critically undercap-
italized, with a ratio of tangible equity to average assets of less
than 2 percent. Our model’s orientation to the 5.5 percent primary
capital to assets ratio differs substantively from the more tradi-
tional surveillance approaches.
3Our model predicts banks that would have a primary capital to
asset ratio falling below 5.5 percent in the next 12 months. Our
results are expected to hold regardless of the regulatory capital
standards in place. The change in regulatory capital standards
from “leverage ratio” to “risk-based” on December 12, 1990, had
no impact on our results.
4It is important to point out that while the high accuracy of the
simple logit model may be partially driven by the inclusion of
lagged capital ratios, which do not seem to change drastically
from one year to the next, our analysis does not include those
banks that were previously capital inadequate.
5These ratios incorporate four quarters of data. Since these ratios
can be significantly affected by mergers, SCOR uses merger-ad-
justed data, where financial statements of the merged banks are
combined for the quarters preceding the merger.
6Collier, Forbush, Nuxoll, and O’Keefe (2003) note the failure of
Best Bank and First National Bank of Keystone as examples
where the FDIC model predicted good ratings just prior to the
failures because of the misstatement of Call Report data.
7According to Cole, Cornyn, and Gunther (1995), inclusion of ad-
ditional variables would not significantly improve the accuracy
of the out-of-sample estimation of the SEER model. In most cas-
es, their inclusion would degrade such accuracy. It is also inter-
esting to note that the SEER Rating model does use current
CAMELS ratings as one of the explanatory variables, while the
FDIC’s SCOR model does not.
8The model performed much better than using CAMELS ratings
alone. The relatively poor performance of the CAMELS ratings
in predicting bank failure during the subsequent two-year period
is attributable to the fact that CAMELS ratings available at any
given date are based upon information that is more dated than
that for the off-site monitoring systems.
9See the OCC’s Examiner’s Guide to Problem Bank Identifica-
tion, Rehabilitation, and Resolution (2001) for a detailed descrip-
tion of monitoring tools used by the OCC.
10The importance of economic scenarios in bank failure has been
documented in a study conducted by the OCC staff (see Wentzler,
Hiemstra, and Jacques, 2001).
11The separation of de novo banks in the OCC model is supported
by previous research (see DeYoung, 2003a and 2003b and Hunter,
Verbrugge, and Whidbee, 1996). De novo banks are less likely to
fail during the first few years and become more likely to fail than
small, established banks over time. In addition, de novo banks are
more affected by adverse economic conditions than other banks.
12They did not test the impact of data revisions on the model’s
ability to predict bank failure.
13The capital benchmark of 5.5 percent was the measure in place
during the sample period.
14The explanatory variables selected to be included in the step-
wise logit model are lagged capital ratio, lagged change in capital
ratio, net income after tax to total assets, average quarterly loan
(agricultural) growth over the year to total loans, average quarter-
ly loan (C&I) growth over the year to total loans, average quar-
terly loan (commercial real estate) growth over the year to total
loans, average quarterly loan (consumer) growth over the year to
total loans, provisions for loan and lease losses to total assets,
nonperforming loans (more than 90 days accruing) to total assets,
agricultural nonperforming loans to total agricultural loans, C&I
nonperforming loans to total C&I loans, consumer nonperforming
loans to total consumer loans, real estate nonperforming loans to
total real estate loans, other real estate loans to total assets, and
investment securities to total assets.
15In addition, less capitalized banks are also more likely to be-
come targets of a takeover (see Wheelock and Wilson, 2000 and
Brewer, Jackson, Jagtiani, and Nguyen, 2000).60 3Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
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